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Countries whose societies are fragmented, and which are in the process of transitioning to 
democracies, face the question of which political system best manages social conflict. Among 
those political systems that deal with conflict resolution in fragmented societies is 
consociationalism. This thesis argues that consociational political systems are prone to 
corruption, but, that specific factors in addition to the consociational arrangement itself activate 
the potential for corruption. An initial regression was conducted to establish the general 
relationship between consociationalism and corruption. A sample of 13 non-consociational 
countries was compared to 13 consociational ones. The regression test included 
consociationalism, political rights and civil liberties as independent variables. Corruption was the 
dependent variable. Results showed a significant relationship between consociational political 
systems and corruption. In addition, an increase in political rights was associated with a decrease 
in corruption. On the other hand, an increase in civil liberties was associated with an increase in 
corruption. These quantitative results were complemented by a qualitative case study of 
Lebanon’s experience with consociationalism. The case study highlights how political corruption 
in Lebanon’s consociational system has been aggravated by patterns of patron-client 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Rationale  
In a world of diverse countries run by different political systems, conflict among those 
countries is inevitable. It is relatively hard to reach an agreement without compromise in an 
international arena encompassing nations with diverse cultures and perspectives. In an effort to 
settle international conflict, “fifty-one countries committed to maintaining international peace 
and security,” founding the United Nations in 1945 (UN.org). In effect, this signified a 
multinational recognition of the detrimental consequences of international conflict. According to 
the Lacina/Gleditsch dataset, from 1946 to 2006, interstate battle deaths, internationalized 
interstate battle deaths, and colonial-conflict battle deaths dropped significantly (Dunne,2010).  
 While the above paragraph elaborates on the efforts that have been implemented to 
resolve conflicts internationally, the main domain of this thesis is worth mentioning—the 
exploration of domestic conflict resolution theories. The sub-discipline in political science that 
has a great deal of literature on domestic conflicts is comparative politics. Generally, societal 
conflicts arise in deeply divided societies (Dunne, 2010). Based on this premise, influxes of 
proposed theories have been put forth in an attempt to resolve such societal conflicts, and these 
theories have gained prominence because of the importance of analyzing the issues that confront 
a plural or heterogeneous society.                  
Stability, an integral part of virtually all countries, is an endeavor that different political 
systems strive to maintain. In order to prevent a state disorder in any given country, governments 




relevancy and the consensus of the governed, in the end, stability is one of the main priorities of 
governments.  
Theoretical Framework    
 Given that stability is an important issue, its significance increases in countries plagued 
with cross-cutting cleavages—countries that have diverse societies in terms of their religion or 
ethnicity. As one means of stabilizing fragmented societies, Arend Lijphart proposed 
consociationalism as a remedial political system for countries that are struggling with conflict 
among their fragmented societies.  
Coping with the fact that conflict in deeply divided societies with cross-cutting cleavages 
is inevitable, Arend Lijphart (1969) introduced his well-known consociationalism theory. 
According to this theory, “consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed 
to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (p.216). For a 
country with a fragmented society, it is necessary to not only recognize the fragmented groups 
but to give every group’s elite an official position in the government.  
To simplify Lijphart’s consociational theory, it merely advocates a democratic 
parliamentary government that employs proportional representation for all groups, giving group 
elites a veto right in order to prevent majoritarian rule and having group elites form a grand 
coalition. For the purpose of illustration, Lijphart’s description of how a grand coalition works is 
as follows: In a plural society, segments collectively govern their country (Lijphart, 1969). 
Accordingly, leaders of segments in the society derive their legitimacy and trust from the people 
who look up to them, like chieftains of tribes. Thus, we can derive the main pillars of 




each group in important policy areas, (3) proportional representation in key institutions, and (4) 
group autonomy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25).  
Statement of the Problem  
Given the definition and characteristics of consociationalism mentioned above, this 
thesis’s main concern (research problem) is that consociationalism is, with some societal 
features, is prone to corruption, “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, 2012). With that definition, how can consociational practices, which are backed by 
constitutional laws, be prone to corruption? In other words, how can a potentially corrupt but 
legal act become an actual act of corruption? What are the consequences of consociationalism if 
it promotes corruption? These questions will be explored in this thesis. 
Research Design  
This research utilizes both quantitative and qualitative designs, making it a mixed-
methods thesis. The quantitative research will statistically test the study’s hypothesis, and two 
quantitative measurements are incorporated. Moreover, the qualitative research will be an in-
depth case study of Lebanon, given that its democratic system is consociational.   
Hypothesis 
This thesis argues that, while consociational arrangements are not by definition corrupt, 
consociational democracies are prone to corruption if other factors are present which allow their 





Importance of the Study 
  
 Many countries struggle with varying issues that pertain to maintaining stability. Among 
those issues is the ability to mitigate diverse societal tensions. Tellingly, theories that deal with 
peace making or conflict resolution are critical. But when consociationalism would most likely 
lead to corruption and further divide the already divided society, it is imperative that research 
focus on assessing the merits of that model. If it fails to do so, consociationalism will continue to 
be considered a strong system that maintains stability, and, thus, its susceptibility to corruption 
would not be known until countries adopt the system. Based on this premise, this study is 
relatively important because it could add more evidence in the literature as to the effectiveness of 
consociationalism as a model for a democratic polity. By suggesting more deficiencies in 
consociationalism, nations transitioning to new democracies will have enough evidence to see 
that they should not adopt a consociational system.   
Key Terms  
 Consociationalism  
 Sectarianism  
 Clientalism  
 Cronyism  
 Favoritism 
 Corruption  
 Wasta  








Chapter Two: Review of the Literature 
In a world of cultural diversity, views and perspectives on life vary significantly among 
its inhabitants. In the international sphere, theories pertaining to interaction among various 
cultures have led to prominent ones conducive to the maintenance of global cultural diversity. 
Among those prominent theories are “cosmopolitanism” and “communitarianism,” both of which 
have recognized the relativity in coping with global cultural diversity. For cosmopolitans, human 
beings, regardless of their culture and ethnicity, are global citizens (Dunne, 2010). Hence, human 
beings are entitled to universal rights and should have access to basic life necessities. 
Cosmopolitans argue that encroachment of these rights by any governmental authority, however, 
requires external intervention to safeguard and preserve the integrity and dignity of global 
citizens. In contrast, communitarians confine the notion of citizenry rights that should be secured 
solely to those who reside within the borders of a particular country, ignoring any issue 
pertaining to others residing outside those borders (Dunne, 2010). Thus, cosmopolitans 
emphasize that all of the entitlements and privileges have no borders in an effort to encompass 
all human beings; on the contrary, communitarians exclusively grant them to inhabitants of their 
own communities.   
Domestically, as opposed to the previous international perspectives, people have sought 
to establish governments that can readily serve and secure not only the society but also the 
integrity and efficiency of its institutions. In deeply divided societies, governments have different 
approaches to dealing with societal diversity and conflict. Domestic conflict in deeply divided 
societies, the focus of this thesis, is an issue that has prompted researchers in scholarly empirical 




“consociationalism,” a theory that is set solely on maintaining stability in deeply divided 
societies (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1991, 1996, 2004). Conflict in the absence of 
stability has been a concern of many scholars: “From Hobbes through Dukheim, Dahrendorf, and 
Samuel Huntington, societies have been analyzed as agglomerations of individuals and/or groups 
whose interests and desires conflict” (Lustick, 1979, p. 326).  
 Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the evidence in the literature that can 
justifiably support, or refute, the research thesis (consociational democracies are prone to 
corruption). In this chapter, an elaborate review of the literature of both, consociationalism and 
corruption, is presented. It is worth mentioning that, after extensive research of a fair amount of 
literature, only one article explicitly connects corruption with consociational democracy 
(Frognier, 1986). Thus, the following paragraphs are reviews of the most appealing scholarly 
articles that separately discuss consociationalism and corruption. 
Arend Lijphart and the History of Consociational Theory 
Stability, an ambitious endeavor for virtually any government, is important to maintain, 
especially in a country with a deeply fragmented society. Accordingly, the first question that 
comes to mind is, how can integration be possible in deeply divided societies? Arend Lijphart 
describes integration with theories that could be categorized under the broad title of theories of 
political integration, nationalism and national unification, regional (international) integration, 
regional (subnational) integration, political development and nation building, political stability, 
and federalism (Lijphart, 1971).  Deutsch (1954) defines integration as the fulfillment “of a 
sense of community, accompanied by formal and informal institutions or practices, sufficiently 




in a country plagued with cross-cutting cleavages, a consociational system can contribute to the 
integration of the society.   
As a method for integrating a deeply divided society, Lijphart proposes his remedial 
theory of establishing a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 
1991, 1996, 2004). Mitigating societal tensions and bringing about an integrated society requires, 
Lijphart emphasizes, one main element of his consociational theory: cooperation among elite 
cartels. Employing all efforts to integrate a fragmented society promises political stability; 
cooperation among elite cartels, however, is relatively critical because if elites of subcultures 
join to counterattack centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation, political stability can be 
sustained in culturally fragmented (Lijphart, 1971). 
While the previous paragraphs describe consociationalism from Lijphart’s perspective, 
the evolution of consociationalism from the decade of its introduction to Lijphart’s most recent 
writings on it is also worth mentioning. The literal term consociational democracy was 
changed—or, as Bormann says, rebaptized—to power-sharing democracy (Bormann, 2011; 
Lijphart, 1985). This change served not only to bring the term up to date but also to narrow it, 
giving it a more practical and acceptable meaning. Moreover, power-sharing is itself an 
expression that portrays consociationalism as a democratic concept. At first glance, however, 
power-sharing means “equality among citizens in a democratic government,” yet this type of 
power-sharing is not what it appears to be. Moreover, power-sharing in a democracy implies 
equality for all citizens, while Lijphart’s power-sharing is specifically among elites.  
Although power-sharing is a new term that serves the purpose of consociational 




to a one of higher relevancy, which is consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 1991, 1999). 
Lijphart argues that consensus democracy significantly differs from majoritarian democracy 
(Lijphart, 1991). The difference between them lies in the composition of their institutions. In a 
consensus democracy, the executive cabinet is oversized, which is a result of appointing people 
from different groups to each cabinet post. In a majoritarian democracy, however, there are a 
minimum number of winning cabinets. When it comes to executive-legislative relations, 
balanced power between the two branches is a main attribute of a consensus democracy, as 
opposed to executive dominance in a majoritarian democracy. As far as the electoral processes 
are concerned, an integral proportional representation is a common characteristic of a consensus 
democracy; on the other hand, plurality and majority electoral systems are commonplace for 
majoritarian democracies (Lijphart, 1991). Since all of the recently mentioned terms emanate 
from consociationalism and to mitigate any ambiguity in this paper, this thesis will use 
consociationalism as the main term instead of power-sharing or consensus democracies. 
Proportional Representation  
Lijphart contends that elite cooperation is facilitated by a constitutional right to form a 
grand coalition, so it is worthwhile to succinctly mention the relative application in a democracy 
that is conducive to the fulfillment of the grand coalition. Correspondingly, the application of 
proportional representation in the legislature surely is a prerequisite for the integrity and stability 
of the grand coalition since, as mentioned earlier, consociational democracies can function 
efficiently and serve their stabilizing purpose through a parliamentary government. Tellingly, the 
application of proportional representation (PR) can bring to the top the most trustworthy elites. 




fragmented groups’ representatives and bestows them with the ultimate authority to compose the 
grand coalition (Bormann, 2011; Lijphart, 2004).   
Grand Coalition    
The establishment of a grand coalition in a consociational democracy serves the 
betterment of the apparatus, demonstrates ethnical inclusivity, and decreases the propensity for 
igniting a civil war (Bormann, 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Since societal tension 
is inevitable in a deeply divided society, respected leaders of the groups can cooperate efficiently 
and democratically for the well-being of the land they all share.  
With respect to inter-elite relations in the grand coalition, a thorough description is vital 
to Lijphart’s portrayal of its effectiveness. After getting accustomed to regular cooperation and 
democratic deliberation, group elites reach a point at which consociational practices become the 
norm (Lijphart, 1969). As Gerhard Lehmbruch asserts, “These norms may become an important 
part of the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through 
time” (Lehmbruch, 1967; Lijphart, 1969). While every group elite possesses the authority to veto 
as part of the balance-of-power environment in which they all interact, Lijphart emphasizes that 
not only will the eventual cooperative atmosphere prevail among them, but they will also 
gradually transcend the relative differences among all cultures they represent.  
Based on the previous articulation of the nature of group elite interaction, the virtuous 
principle of “nation comes first” can influence group elites to an extent that they come to a 
realization that patriotism should emanate from segments to the whole nation. Indeed, according 





Group Autonomy      
While two of consociationalism theory’s pillars, grand coalition and PR, have been 
elaborated on, it is necessary to illustrate the other two pillars. For group autonomy, the authority 
of decision making is conceivably its main indicator. In contrast with majority rule, segmental or 
group autonomy “means that decision-making authority is delegated to the separate segments as 
much as possible” (Lijphart, 1979, p. 500). In majority-rule systems, the relative dominance of 
the majority is over the minority.  
In contrast, in a consociational system, the principle behind group autonomy not only 
prevents the majority from dominating the minority, it also gives a minority authority over itself. 
Since the entire group elites in the grand coalition are minorities deliberating with other 
minorities, the sheer existence of this system prevents any majority from engaging in hegemonic 
abuse of the system. 
According to Jan-Erik Lane, “any group in a democratic system will tend to respect the 
democratic rules of the game and hence contribute to democratic stability if it enjoys a 
satisfactory combination of influence on the central political system and autonomy with regard to 
its own affairs” (as cited in Lijphart, 1979, p. 500).  Consociationalism’s success can be achieved 
only if it functions within a democracy (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1991, 1996, 
2004). Instead of, in a democracy, conceding their right to participate in governing their country 
to an autocrat, inhabitants in a segmented society can have their opinions resonate through the 
electoral democratic process of voting their representatives into office, which, in turn, reflects the 






 In an effort to protect their autonomy and manifest the consociational system’s 
credibility, each group enjoys an authoritative veto (Lijphart, 1996). This way, no group or 
groups have veto authority when others do not. Some countries with solid majorities, like 
Belgium and Cyprus, have group veto entrenched in their constitutions, but Lijphart’s preference 
is an informal group veto (Lijphart, 1996), in part because of the ever-changing population 
demographics in most countries. Therefore, a constitutional group veto prevents other potentially 
growing groups from having this right to themselves. Moreover, it can be inferred that an 
informal group veto establishes a balance of power among participating groups in the grand 
coalition.  
Proponents of Consociational Theory 
 Having discussed the history and main themes of Lijphart’s consociational theory, it is 
now crucial to address the theory’s impact on other scholars. Hence, in this section, prominent 
articles by consociational theory proponents shall be reviewed. Emphasizing that consociational 
principles are valid and plausible in a deeply divided society, Ian Lustick assures that 
consociationalism is a significant system that provides stability in countries where it is direly 
needed (Lustick, 1979).  
 The purpose of Lustick’s study was to explain how consociationalism can maintain 
stability in fragmented societies and contribute to the democratic process it employs. However, 
he hypothesizes that adding “control” to the consociationalism apparatus will enhance the 
system. In his secondary qualitative study, he analyzes an important element in a consociational 




the main mechanism not only for uniting the fragmented society but also for constituting a 
democratic body that conveys peoples’ demands (Lustick, 1979). Yet, this grand coalition needs 
to be modified because the authorities all groups enjoy may cause conflict in the coalition. 
Accordingly, Lustick introduces control as a means to stabilize the grand coalition’s working 
environment. “Consociational models can be deployed effectively only if an alternative 
typological category of ‘control’ (or domination) is available” (Lustick, 1979, p. 326).  
 When consociational democracies, in principle, endeavor to maintain stability within 
their deeply divided societies, certain issues must be assessed. According to Lustick, the 
overarching commitment of elite cartels to their coalitions is a fact that cannot be denied 
(Lustick, 1979). However, what perpetuates this stable commitment? Lustick’s concern is that, 
while consociational theory’s approach is to resolve the relative problematic tensions that arise in 
fragmented societies by establishing a grand coalition consisting of elite cartels, these elite 
cartels—with all of their authority—may transfer the tensions that exist within the society to the 
elites themselves (Lustick, 1979).  
 Based on the latter, adding a category of control in consociational democracies will not 
only perpetuate societal stability, it will also permanently prevent any potential devastating 
conflict that might arise among the elite cartels. Hence, Lustick argues that there must be a 
dominant elite with authority over all the subcultural elites in order to prevent any conflict that 
might lead to a braekdown (Lustick, 1979).  
 Given that consociationalism focuses on maintaining cooperation among elite cartels, the 
control factor, if applied, would focus on the more practical method of maintaining cooperation 




mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another 
segment or segments” (Lustick, 1979, p. 328). For example, in a parliamentary system, the prime 
minister is responsible for implementing the laws, and, as head of the majority party, he or she 
represents the government and the parliament. This being said, the prime minister cannot work 
with a second prime minister or more. In other words, in efforts to implement laws passed by 
parliament, a problematic obstacle would prevent the prime minister from doing anything if 
another official with the same authority was in place. Although parliamentary representatives 
may cast a no-confidence vote to establish a new government, this particular authority does not 
conflict with the prime minister’s superiority in many political aspects.  
 If a superordinate group over all elites is not in place, an unproductive consequence of a 
consociational democracy is the likelihood of justifying the status-quo (Lustick, 1979). Given 
that consociationalism, without the control factor, renders equal authority to all leaders of the 
segments, there is a high susceptibility that they will justify and insist on sustaining the status 
quo simply to avoid compromising to an unlimited extent. Moreover, group elites may be well 
aware of the relative chaos a particular piece of legislation could create if they all agreed on it. 
This is the difficulty of governing among officials who have equal powers.  
Lustick emphasized viewing the categorical control factor as a contribution to the 
consociational school, but another scholar who is considered a member of the consociational 
school has also made some interesting assertions. Taking consociationalism as an analytical 
point of departure to research the ever-growing conflicts in deeply divided societies, Alan Siaroff 
compares and contrasts centrifugal democracies with consociational democracies. Hence, the 




presumably prevent centrifugal democracies from breaking down. In doing so, he focused on the 
causes that led to centrifugal democracies’ breaking down in some cases but in others (Siaroff, 
2000).   
Centrifugal democracies, Sairoff states, are fragmented polities, but unlike in 
consociational democracies, inter-elite relations in centrifugal democracies are described as 
being engaged in competitive behavior, not cooperation (2000). While consociational 
democracies are described as fragmented but stable, centrifugal democracies are considered 
fragmented and unstable. Centrifugal democracies are plagued with the detrimental state of not 
only fragmentation, but also instability. In his study, Sairoff focused on bringing about a stable 
remedial solution for currently unstable centrifugal democracies.  
While Siaroff’s study was significantly grounded on Lijphart’s consociational theory, he 
alluded to Giovanni Sartori’s conceptualization of “polarized pluralism” (Siaroff, 2000; Sartori, 
1976). Accordingly, Sartori (1966) defines polarized pluralism as encompassing eight features: 
“(1) relevant anti-system parties, (2) bilateral opposition, (3) one or more parties clearly in a 
center position, (4) polarization, (5) centrifugal drives, (6) ideological patterning, (7) 
irresponsible oppositions, and (8) the politics of outbidding” (as cited in Siaroff, 2000, p. 317). 
That being said, Siaroff mainly asserts that, based upon all of the above-mentioned features of 
polarized pluralism, the central and overarching feature stems from the “centrifugal drives” 
(Siaroff, 2000).  
Quantitatively, Siaroff studied thirteen centrifugal democracies in an effort to determine 
why some centrifugal democracies had broken down while others had not. Consistently, Siaroff 




Italy after the First World War; Spain from 1931 onwards; Finland, France, and Italy after the 
Second World War; Brazil from 1961 onwards; Chile as of 1964; Belgium since the early 1970s; 
and El Salvador from 1982 onwards” (Siaroff, 2000, p. 319). Regarding Siaroff’s analyses of all 
of the above-mentioned centrifugal democracies, his time series cross-national study was limited 
to national political regimes (Siaroff, 2000). 
In an effort to incorporate testable variables in this study, Lijphart’s (1985) favorable 
factors that are conducive to consociational democracy were tested in all of the thirteen 
centrifugal democracies. The favorable factors are “1) cross-cutting economic cleavages, 2) 
external effects, 3) moderate countrywide nationalism, 4) external threats to the nation, 5) a 
moderate number of segments, 6) segments of equal size, 7) small population size, 8) 
overarching loyalties, 9) geographic concentration of segments, 10) traditions of compromise 
and accommodation, and 11) absence of a solid majority” (as cited in Siaroff, 2000, p. 320). 
Utilizing a t-test to determine the relevance of these factors, Siaroff gave a +1 for a factor that 
was present, –1 for the absence of a factor, and 0 for a mixed or vague factor (Siaroff, 2000).      
While cross-cutting economic cleavages, external effects, and moderate countrywide 
nationalism were statistically significant, the absence of a solid majority factor was positive in all 
centrifugal democracies that broke down (Siaroff, 2000). In deriving the many factors conducive 
to consociational democracies in order to assess their validity in centrifugal democracies, Siaroff 
concludes that, in the absence of some relevant collective factors of consociational democracies, 




All in all, the primary effectiveness of consociational theory has interested many scholars 
concerned with domestic conflict resolution. Scholars like Siaroff utilize the many factors it has 
to offer in their endeavors to prescribe a remedy for unstable centrifugal democracies.  
The proponents’ consensus  
 Undoubtedly, Lijphart’s initial introduction of his consociational theory in the academic 
sphere has attracted many concerned scholars to not only support his theory and align themselves 
with him but also utilize consociational factors in their own studies to measure, enhance, assess, 
and modify theories of conflict resolution in plural societies. Indeed, this shows that Lijphart has 
established a theoretical framework from which concerned scholars of conflict resolution in 
plural societies can derive many testable hypotheses that are conducive to the improvement of 
their studies in this field. Taking into account the devastating and immobilizing effect that 
instability has on countries, consociational theory offers a means to democratic stabilizing that 
can mitigate conflict to an extent that plural societies can reach a stable consensus (Lijphart, 
1984). In addition to prescribing remedial theories aimed at alleviating the relative tensions in 
fragmented countries, consociationalism has contributed to the body of comparative politics 
literature.  
Opponents of Consociational Theory 
 Since the previous paragraphs synthesized prominent arguments made by proponents of 
consociational theory, a necessary elaboration of the prominent opposing arguments is of high 
importance for the integrity and impartiality of this literature review. In a critical study about the 
validity of the claim that consociational theory can mitigate conflict in segmented societies, Joel 




As a result of their skepticism, Selway and Templeman conducted a quantitative empirical study 
aimed solely at identifying the inefficiencies of consociationalism (Selway & Templeman, 
2011). However, in an effort to evaluate the ultimate reason that consociationalism is said to 
stabilize deeply divided societies, this present study’s purpose is to test whether political 
violence occurs more in consociational democracies than others. 
 The reason that Selway and Templeman focused on political institutions’ effects on 
political violence is the sheer fact that a country with an increasingly high rate of political 
violence surely suffers from a political defect in its apparatus. In other words, political violence 
was a clear indicator of a problem with the political system. Hence, in their study, political 
violence is measured by the number of riots and political deaths per year in every country. 
 After searching for particular indicators that can help researchers accurately identify a 
consociational democracy, Selway and Templeman agreed that three prominent features, if 
present, indicate that a country is considered to have a consociational system. These features 
must be present at the federal level and involve a parliamentary government with proportional 
representation (Selway & Templeman, 2011; Lijphart, 2004).  
 With those features in mind, Selway and Templeman (2011) rendered four hypotheses for 
their study, which were as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The marginal effect of PR on political violence is negative when ethnic 




Hypothesis 2: The marginal effect of parliamentarism on political violence is negative 
when ethnic fractionalization is high, but parliamentarism has no effect when ethnic 
fractionalization is low.      
Hypothesis 3: The marginal effect of federalism on political violence is negative when 
ethnic fractionalization is high, but federalism has no effect when ethnic fractionalization 
is low.       
Hypothesis 4: The marginal effect of consociationalism on political violence is negative 
when ethnic fractionalization is high, but consociationalism has no effect when ethnic 
fractionalization is low (p. 11).  
 All of the above hypotheses are about the impact of “institutions conditioned on the level 
of ethnic fractionalization” (Selway & Templeman, 2011). The authors use the term ethnic 
fractionalization as a synonym for deeply divided society.  
 In their quantitative study, Selway and Templeman (2011) conducted a time series cross-
national analysis of 106 country-regimes between 1972 and 2003. Although most of their data 
was drawn from Pippa Norris’s Democracy Time-Series Cross-National Dataset, the most 
appropriate data, in that it coincides with their attempt to measure political violence (total 
number of political deaths and violent riots) came from both the Arthur Banks Cross-National 
Time-Series Database and the Major Episodes of Political Violence (POLDEATH) (Selway & 
Templeman, 2011). If the relationships are found to be statistically significant, then their findings 
suggest that the more political violence a consociational democracy has, the more fragile the 




 After testing these hypotheses and taking into account other factors that might cause 
political violence, Selway and Templeman stated some important results. First, however, it is 
highly important to mention a crucial aspect of their study. As stated earlier, the study takes into 
account the main features of consociational countries and compares them with their opposites 
(e.g., PR over majoritarian rules, federal over unitary systems, and parliamentary over 
presidential and semipresidential systems). The results revealed that larger countries have more 
riots and political deaths. Second, democratic countries are not likely to have a significant 
number of political deaths and riots when compared with nondemocratic countries. Third, while 
federalist governments appear to have fewer political deaths and more riots, parliamentary 
regimes experience fewer political deaths and more riots (Selway and Templeman, 2011).   
 Based on these results, some important findings have been laid out by the authors. PR 
systems are associated with substantial levels of political violence, while presidential systems 
have relatively low levels of political violence (Selway & Templeman, 2011). Also, “the 
combination of consociationalist institutions is associated with higher levels of political 
violence” (Selway & Templeman, 2011, p. 23).   
 All in all, this study separately tests all three of the main features of consociationalism 
(PR, federalism, and parliamentarism), and then it tests the features in combination. By 
associating the features as independent variables with political violence, as the main dependent 
variable, Selway and Templeman have suggested that consociationalism is, in reality, not serving 
its main purpose of maintaining stability given the levels of political violence that consociational 
countries have. Hence, the authors found that “presidentialism was beneficial in divided societies 




parliamentarism, and federalism together did not reduce political violence” (Selway & 
Templeman, 2011, p. 25). 
 While the previous article was a time-series cross-national quantitative study, another 
scholarly article on the subject was conducted with a different research design. In his qualitative 
in-depth case study, Imad Salamey explains the failure of consociationalism in Lebanon. 
Salamey (2009) examined the consequences of political sectarianism in the consociational 
context. Moreover, the purpose of his study was to challenge the notion that the sectarian ideal of 
“corporate” consociationalism is sufficient for transitional plural democracies.  
 Whereas corporatism is described as “the incorporation of interest groups into the process 
of policy formation and implementation” (Lijphart, 1991), corporate consociationalism 
prearranges official positions “among ethnic and sectarian national groups” (Salamey, 2009). In 
this context, Salamey equates interest groups with sectarian and ethnic groups in the political 
processes but with the major difference of fixed official appointments. In other words, interest 
groups do play a role in politics, but each can be replaced by another interest group due to the 
competitiveness among them and the fact that they do not have permanent official positions 
reserved for them. Sectarian and ethnic groups, however, enjoy all of the interest groups’ 
entitlements and, in addition, their fixed, permanent official positions. In turn, Salamey argues, 
this predetermined positioning that sectarian and ethnic groups enjoy is what leads to a more 
polarized and divided society (Salamey, 2009).  
 Given their predetermined official positions, sectarian groups fortify their offices by 
adding more officials from their own sects, creating separate governmental entities within the 




consociationalism is effectively establishing foreign alliances with each sectarian elite and 
influencing the country, given that the sects do not need one another to cooperate (Salamey, 
2009). In addition, corporate consociationalism neglects a decisive issue of spatial formation and 
new emerging groups (Salamey, 2009). Indeed, based on the predetermined positions that are 
stated in the Lebanese constitution, for example, a constitutional amendment is required every 
time a new group emerges; this means there is a high potential for constant conflict among 
groups. As a result, corporate consociational arrangements in Lebanon have contributed to a 
more divided society and an unstable country (Salamey, 2009).  
 Given the skepticism that Salamey has about consociationalism and the negative 
consequences it has on the Lebanese state, he suggests “integrative consociationalism” as a 
theory of enhancement to the sectarian entrenchment that consociationalism has brought about in 
Lebanon. According to Salamey, the “Lebanese geopolitical interconnectivity” and the 
variability of rapidly growing groups impede the “corporate sectarian-based consociational 
state,” which eventually prompts the groups to backslide to the point that they are exclusively 
confined to sectarian domination or foreign attachments (Salamey, 2009). Salamey argues that 
consociationalism has not only worsened the Lebanese integrative endeavor but also has made 
the societal situation so centrifugal that the average Lebanese has to affiliate with a major 
sectarian group in order to survive.  
 Moreover, Salamey’s proposition regarding the remedial theory of “integrative 
consociationalism” means it is an “institutional formulation that injects political stimulation and 
incentives for inter-sectarian accommodation and cross-cutting cleavages formation” (Salamey, 




power-sharing arrangements through combining democratic proportional rule with that of 
sectarian consociationalism” (Salamey, 2009, p. 95).  
 In practical terms, integrative consociationalism, according to Salamey, can be 
formulated through institutional arrangements that follow integrative consociationalism ideals, 
and they are “bicameralism, duality of administrative local and national governance, mixed 
electoral system and cross-cutting electoral districting” (Salamey, 2009, p. 95). By adopting 
integrative consociational principles, Lebanon can preserve sectarian interests while at the same 
time efficiently accommodating new, growing groups into the representative system of 
governance in an effort to mitigate potential conflicts and sectarian-based strife (Salamey, 2009). 
 Although Salamey derives the principles of his integrative consociational theory from 
Lijphart’s consociationalism theory, this does not mean that Salamey supports consociationalism, 
per se. The reader might be puzzled regarding Salamey’s argument being included with those 
from the group of scholars from the consociational school of thought, believing that integrative 
consociationalism is a mere advancement of Lijphart’s consociationalism. However, this is not 
the case. Salamey’s argument is, de facto, a practical and realist one that deals with Lebanon’s 
current situation as it is. Hence, Salamey’s integrative consociational theory is not necessarily an 
endorsement of Lijphart’s consociationalism, but it is a temporary strategy to help abolish the 
centrifugal impetuses in Lebanon’s consociational system. If integrative consociationalism had 
been adopted, the Lebanese people would be ready for a new system that functions without any 





Why It All Matters 
 In conclusion, consociationalism is a theory that aims to accommodate deeply divided 
societies plagued with cross-cutting cleavages. While patriotic nationalism is a hard to attain in 
such societies, consociationalism deals with the status quo in order to prevent any sort of 
potential strife or civil war. This is the key argument that proponents of consociationalism 
invoke as their platform. As mentioned in the literature, deeply divided societies undermine 
governmental leaders by expressing some skepticism about those leaders’ favoring people from 
their sects. Accordingly, this is why consociational theory emphasizes the role that elite cartels 
play in the betterment of their societies. Considering the trust that elites have from their people, 
the establishment of an authoritative grand coalition can satisfy the segments; of course, this is 
contingent upon cooperation among the elite cartels.  
 While proponents of consociationalism argue that the application of consociational 
features in deeply divided countries will decrease the propensity of domestic conflict, opponents 
do not consider this a valid argument. From the literature mentioned earlier, opponents of 
consociationalism believe that it increases domestic conflict more than other political systems 










 Aristotle once wrote that “there are three kinds of constitution, or an equal number of 
deviations, or, as it were, corruption of these three kinds.… The deviation or corruption of 
kingship is tyranny. Both kingship and tyranny are forms of government by a single person, but 
… the tyrant studies his own advantage.… The king looks to that of his subjects” (as cited in 
Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 3). Of course, during Aristotle’s era, kings were portrayed as 
democratically elected leaders, unlike previous hereditary kings or monarchs.  
 While Aristotle’s conceptualization of corruption as a deviation that leads to negative 
consequences, other influential philosophers have also expressed their insights on the subject. 
According to Rousseau, corruption should be looked at from a moral standpoint. Asserting that 
human nature was pure but that humans became corrupt once they formed societies, Rousseau 
states that the fact that humans in society search for power is an evident attribute of corruption 
(as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002). Acquiescing to the inevitable notion of humans’ 
adopting a corrupt nature, equality combined with good laws, Rousseau argues, should prevent 
“power-hungry individuals” from corrupting the society (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 
2002).  Hence, it is individuals’ unlimited pursuit of power that makes society corrupt. 
Accordingly, it is not the mere entrance of humans into society that makes them corrupt, per se; 
it is the corrupting influences of power-hungry individuals that prompt humans to engage in 
deviant pursuits.  
 Rousseau saw corruption vested primarily in power-hungry individuals; Montesquieu, 
however, saw that corruption lies in the political system. He deemed corruption “the 




one, a monarchy into a despotism” (as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 19). Given 
that Montesquieu is the theorizer of “the separation of powers,” there is no wondering why he 
attributes corruption to the state of the political system. Hence, a system that does not adopt the 
separation of powers is prone to corruption because it provides a disarray of power in which any 
branch of government can dominate the rest. In that situation, the executive branch will have the 
lion’s share of domination because it encompasses the means of coercion.  
  Another prominent philosopher, Machiavelli, offered some significant perspectives on 
corruption. According to Machiavelli, “corruption was the process by which the virtue of the 
citizen was undermined and the virtue of the good destroyed” (as cited in Heidenheimer & 
Johnston, 2002, p. 18).  Given that humans are weak and that their weaknesses may affect their 
good virtue, unless a great leader compensates for their weaknesses, corruption will prevail 
(Friedrich, 1972). Tellingly, Machiavelli believed that the notion of virtue has to be embodied in 
a leader, with an influential character, who can lead the masses to their greater good. In contrast, 
a corrupt leader will only degrade virtue to an extent that he becomes a despot—a despot ruling a 
corrupt country that, due to his despotic nature, will be hard to maintain.  
 In addition to citing these great philosophers, it is worthwhile to refer to what Karl Marx 
has to say about corruption. Although Marxism, in theory, described capitalism as the ultimate 
corrupt system, it did not explicitly address corruption itself. Given the bold, corrupt acts of the 
Soviet Union, practices of corruption were utterly manifested in their bureaucracies (Friedrich, 
1972). The lesson that can be drawn from the Soviet Union’s domestic corruption is that the 




 Having cited prominent philosophers’ perspectives on the notion of corruption, in which 
they are shown to have a tendency to look at abstract moral aspects, we now turn to the 
conceptualizations produced by contemporary scholars. Broadly, there are definitions of 
corruption in legal terms, and there are other definitions of corruption in public interest and 
opinion terms.  
 Legally, Yale Professor James C. Scott has defined corruption, saying that when “an 
official’s act is prohibited by laws established by the government, it is corrupt; if it is not 
prohibited, it is not corrupt even if it is abusive or unethical” (as cited in Heidenheimer & 
Johnston, 2002, p. 29). Consequently, a strict and literal interpretation of the law is legally 
permissible even if the concerned law is unjust. For example, when voting rights in the United 
States were bestowed only to white male property owners, a voting-booth worker’s refusal to 
extend the right to vote to white men who did not own property, women, or African Americans 
was not a corrupt act. By virtue of amendments, these rights can be inclusive, but they are 
contingent upon an amendment, meaning that the law has to be purposefully changed since 
revolting against it will not make a difference.  
 In contrast, according to the public interest definition of corruption, if a law is unjust and 
detrimental to the people and conflicts with the public’s interest, even if it is legal, it is corrupt 
(Gardiner, 1993).  Tellingly, representatives should anticipate the consequences of proposed 
legislation on areas of the public’s interest. Moreover, for a legal but unjust law to be uncorrupt, 
it needs to align with the public’s interest. Thus, in California, the legalization of marijuana for 





 When it comes to public opinion’s definition of corruption, Arnold Heidenheimer offered 
an interesting description. According to Heidenheimer (1989), public opinion views of 
corruption are subject to three categorical implications: white, gray, or black corruption. Black 
corruption is explicitly deemed corrupt not only by the public but also by elites. Gray corruption 
is revealed in an act that elites consider corrupt and punishable but that the public views 
somewhat ambivalently. While black and gray corruption have either a majority of consensus or 
a one-side consensus, a white act of corruption is one that is tolerated by the majority of both the 
elites and the general public, who do not see a need for a punishment to be imposed 
(Heidenheimer, 1989).  
 With reference to consociational arrangements, a key feature of it is favoritism. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary (2012), the word favoritism means “the practice of giving 
unfair preferential treatment to one person or group at the expense of another.” Indeed, 
preferential treatment of one group is a big concern given that the law established by 
consociationalism favors elite cartels’ authoritative positions in the grand coalition.  
 If it is legal to bestow favored positions on elite cartels in the grand coalition, how can 
that act be corrupt? Aren’t the elite cartels following the law? The legitimization of favoritism 
reflected in elite cartels’ positions in the grand coalition and the deeming of this act as corrupt is 
the crux of this thesis. Indeed, using the legal definition of corruption provided by Scott, which 
considers an official’s act corrupt only if the act is against the law, an act that does not break the 
law is legal even if it is overtly corrupt (Scott, 1972). Before illustrating the relevant literature 
that connects consociationalism with corruption, it is worthwhile to elucidate some of the 





 While there is universal condemnation on corruption per se, some scholars argue that the 
mere existence of corruption in underdeveloped countries can contribute to the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy. Accordingly, Pierre-Guillaume Meon and Laurent Weill have conducted an 
empirical study devoted to illuminating some positive aspects of corruption. In their study, Meon 
and Weill (2009) test whether “corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels” of an 
incompetent and inefficient bureaucracy. They tested two contrasting hypotheses: “greasing the 
wheel” and “sanding the wheel.” The “greasing the wheel” hypothesis states that in countries 
where governments are defective, corruption is relatively beneficial in that it speeds up 
bureaucratic efficiency, but it is detrimental elsewhere. In contrast, the “sanding the wheel” 
hypothesis posits that in countries where governments are defective, and even those where they 
are effective, corruption is detrimental to investment and growth in all respects (Meon & 
Laurent, 2009). The difference between the two hypotheses is that the former asserts that 
corruption may increase efficiency, while the latter emphasizes that the more corrupt a country 
is, the more likely it is that corruption will reduce efficiency, even in deficient institutions (Meon 
& Laurent, 2009).      
 Hence, the purpose of their study was to test the validity of the above-mentioned 
hypotheses. They focused on measuring productivity in a panel of sixty-nine developed and 
developing countries with respect to aggregate efficiency, corruption and other dimensions of 
governance. In an effort to quantitatively test the hypotheses, Meon and Laurent’s study sought 
to compare each country’s level of productivity, manifested in the data on a given country’s 




 The results of this study were interesting because they provided evidence of weakness in 
the “grease the wheel” hypothesis as well as other evidence of robustness. With respect to the 
weakness of the hypothesis, the analysis resulted in a statistically positive relationship between 
corruption and aggregate inefficiency, but only in well-developed governments. As far as the 
robustness of the hypothesis is concerned, the results indicated an inverse relationship between 
corruption and aggregate efficiency, but solely in deficient governments (Meon & Laurent, 
2009). Although this hypothesis is plausible in developed countries, it is not applicable to 
developing countries. Thus, corruption in developing countries can contribute to their betterment 
and efficiency so long as these countries strive to progressively move forward to becoming 
developed ones. 
 In conclusion, Meon and Laurent are not promoting corruption, per se; they are taking a 
practical look at more-efficient means of helping developing countries move forward. Instead of 
putting substantial efforts into and allocating large funds to counter-corruption agencies, 
developing countries can utilize corruption in a practical way, although only temporarily. In 
doing so, developing countries can allocate funds to other developmental programs that can help 
the economy flourish. This is not legitimizing acts of corruption; rather, it is only temporarily 
turning a blind eye to them. Adding more grease to the wheel can not only help make the 
government more efficient but also change the status quo of the country to an extent that it is 
given a short-cut to becoming a developed country.  
 While Meon’s and Laurent’s study focused on facilitating corruption in developing 
countries to make their governments more efficient, another study emphasized that bureaucratic 




in an effort to show that corruption can help develop countries. According to Leff, in autocratic 
regimes, where bureaucracies monopolize the economic environment, entrepreneurs will 
compete against each other for access to government (Leff, 1964). Indeed, bureaucracies, under 
autocratic direction, have the authority of implementation, meaning they can sign contracts with 
any company they prefer. Hence, Leff suggests that, in this noncompetitive environment, 
entrepreneurs can establish a good relationship with the concerned bureaucracy and, in turn, have 
their projects embraced by the bureaucracy. In addition, their entrepreneurial projects will be 
implemented, benefiting the economy and the citizens (Leff, 1964). 
 “Although lip-service may be paid to the importance of economic development, the 
government and bureaucracy are oriented primarily to maintaining the status quo” (as cited in 
Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 312). Therefore, the status quo can be disrupted when 
entrepreneurs find their strategic paths to persuade the bureaucracy. Among the many means of 
persuasion, graft can have beneficial effects and “can provide the direct incentive necessary to 
mobilize the bureaucracy for more energetic action on behalf of the entrepreneurs” (as cited in 
Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002, p. 313). According to Leff, the significant role that the 
bureaucracy plays in the economy can be directed along a progressive path that can help the 
economy flourish. Again, while bureaucracies have an authoritative monopoly over the 
economy, entrepreneurs have to take advantage of ways to potentially become closer to them, 
even if they have to do that with corrupt acts.                        
     Another beneficial effect of corruption is that it reduces uncertainty and increases 
investment (Leff, 1964). Having a close connection with bureaucrats, entrepreneurs can, in cases 




have on their investments (Leff, 1964). Indeed, the autocratic environment in which they all 
function in can allow entrepreneurs, if they have political leverage, to share the monopolizing 
authority that bureaucracies acquire. In other words, in times of political uncertainty and crisis, 
entrepreneurs can play a dominant role in tailoring any new policies to their benefit.  
 Again, Leff is describing how corruption can help improve the economy only in 
underdeveloped, autocratic countries and how this endeavor can be furthered by entrepreneurs. 
Based on Leff’s arguments, he is proposing realistic solutions for people who live in autocratic 
countries. The expression “the ends justify the means” does not sound very negative in this 
context. Indeed, Leff looks at providing some practical means, even through corruption, to help 
improve underdeveloped countries’ economic situations.  
 Searching for the necessary loopholes is a vital endeavor when dealing with an autocratic 
regime that does not abide by a certain law. Thus, entrepreneurs can take advantage of corruption 
to make their innovative ideas emerge. With a more global consciousness, people come to realize 
the beneficial outcomes of democratizing their countries, but until they can attain this ideal, they 
must deal with the status quo and not wait. If they are practical and want to improve their 
countries’ economies, entrepreneurs have to realize that corruption can be temporarily 
legitimized if it will eventually serve a good purpose. Therefore, until their countries become 
democratized, entrepreneurs must take necessary steps to improve the economy, even if it 






Corruption and Consociationalism 
 Lijphart’s statement acknowledging consociationalism’s susceptibility to corruption 
provided support for this thesis. In other words, Lijphart’s acknowledgment adds more rigor to 
this thesis in that it conveys a genuine connection between corruption and consociationalism 
from the very person who argued for consociationalism’s practicality in the first place. Lijphart 
says, “It may be hypothesized that the greater clarity of responsibility in majoritarian 
democracies inhibits corruption and that the consensus systems’ tendency to compromise and 
‘deal-making’ fosters corrupt practices” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 289). Based on this 
acknowledgement, this thesis takes this statement as a point of departure to describe what type of 
corruption that consociationalism produces, which is favoritism.  
 Upon delving into the literature on consociationalism, finding a study that argued solely 
that consociationalism is susceptible to corruption was extremely difficult. After extensive 
research, an interesting article surfaced; it was written in French by a Belgian scholar named A.-
P. Frognier, and translated to English by Doig, in 1986. Frognier explicitly associates 
consociationalism with corruption, even in the title (Corruption and Consociational Democracy: 
First Thoughts on the Belgian Case). The main purpose of the article was to describe how 
consociationalism has facilitated corrupt practices in Belgium. In the 1980s, measures of 
corruption accurate enough to determine countries’ ranks were not available; Frognier 
acknowledges that fact but offers some interesting insights into how corruption manifests in 
Belgium.  
 To begin with, Frognier describes Belgian politics as encompassing “all the hallmarks of 




sectors of the Belgian government as parts of the elite cartels, though in Belgium they are called 
“political families,” “ideological families,” or even “sociological worlds” (Frognier, 1986).  
 Having a crucial question in mind—whether consociationalism can accentuate corruption 
or prevent it—Frognier rendered two hypotheses. The first one says, “The more dealings 
between elites, the greater the chances for corruption” (Frognier, 1986, p. 144). His hypothesis is 
based on the notion that corruption is an unavoidable result of the exercise of power. Hence, 
Frognier (1986) speculated that consociationalism can increase the practice of corruption if it 
provides the potentiality of corrupt practices. His second hypothesis—actually a 
counterhypothesis—says, “Opening up the decision making processes to several sectors in a 
society would lessen the need to use corruption as a functional alternative to direct participation 
in power” (Frognier, 1986, p. 144). According to this hypothesis, the institutionalization of 
negotiations between social and political actors contributes to lessened conflict between them 
and can prevent the tyranny of the majority.  
 Moreover, Frognier found some interesting results. Some evidence supports his second 
hypothesis, for which the institutionalization of negotiations is relatively effective; nevertheless, 
in his case study, negotiations among elites were not positive (Frognier, 1986). Given that 
consociationalism strives to establish a cooperative environment among elite cartels in the grand 
coalition, this empowerment makes elites work together corruptly; it produces a “loud silence” 
(Frognier, 1986). Given the absence of opposition parties, a result of all parties’ having a group 
leader in the grand coalition, the mass media and other dissenters cannot voice their criticisms, 




permanent position assignments for elite cartels, those cartels seek to maintain good reputations 
through “self-protection” (Frognier, 1986).  
 Threatening that a change in the status quo may lead to disastrous outcomes, elite cartels 
try to cover up any scandals. Although, as in many democracies, Belgium’s campaign processes 
involve some wealthy contributors seeking political influence, this is not important in how 
consociationalism prompts corrupt practices in Belgium. Frognier is critical of the public 
prosecutor, of whom it is well known that he “is particularly cautious about inquiring into cases 
of political corruption at the highest level.… This caution itself is a factor which helps inter-
family political trade-offs and internal policing and which reinforces the general preference for 
self-protection” (Frognier, 1986, p. 146). Therefore, the notion of self-protection is made valid 
through the ways in which the public prosecutor cannot inquire about any cases of political 
corruption pertaining to the political class only because of his cautiousness.  
Hence, elite cartels are immune from official scrutiny because the consociational put 
them over the law. Tellingly, it can be inferred from Frognier’s article that Belgium’s elites’ 
behavior to seek self-protection and to avoid any public scrutiny for political corruption is based 
on the relative fear that the system will collapse. Therefore, Belgium’s case of political 
corruption portrays that consociationalism not only can justify practices of corruption but that the 
whole theory is “hanging by a thread.” (Frognier, 1986). 
Why It All Matters 
 Corruption has been condemned in every society, from the ancient Greeks to modern 
times. Looking at it from a legal, moral, or practical perspective, corruption has disastrous 




corruption can be utilized and even render positive results, they still prescribe the usage of 
corruption as a temporary resort. Thus, proponents of corruption still condemn it, but they 
suggest using it only in underdeveloped countries that seek to improve their economies. Once 
they have developed their economies to the point that they are similar to those of developed 
countries, the underdeveloped countries can then forego the use of corruption. This does not 
mean that corruption can be easily used and then stopped.  
 With regard to consociationalism and corruption, Frognier’s article gives a better 
understanding of how consociationalism can produce corrupt practices. Indeed, elite cartels not 
only enjoy immunity and power, but the principles related to their enjoyment of these 
authoritative positions are fundamentally corrupt. The idea that a fragmented country should be 
ruled by elites makes some consociational countries susceptible to corruption. Frognier shows 
how Belgium’s political class has reinforced its power through the consociational system, which 
has given them political leverage to be above the law.  
 All in all, this literature review’s endeavor is to shed light on the many arguments 
pertaining to consociationalism and corruption. Scholars of conflict resolution have put 
substantial effort into rendering theories that identify the problems and remedial theories that 
help enhance the situation; Lijphart’s consociationalism is one of them. By introducing 
consociationalism, Lijphart has significantly contributed to the body of knowledge and should be 
credited for that. But, thoroughly analyzing of what consociationalism has to offer raises 
important concerns, one of which is its propensity for corruption. A careful analysis of 
consociationalism shows how some factors in some countries makes its consociational system 




Chapter Three: Methods & Results 
Corruption is and has always been a plague that corrodes societies and their 
governmental institutions. Given that consociational democracies are the focus of this study, the 
thesis is attempting to test the following hypothesis: consociational democracies are prone to 
corruption. According to Arend Lijphart, “it may be hypothesized that the greater clarity of 
responsibility in majoritarian democracies inhibits corruption and that the consensus systems’ 
tendency to compromise and ‘deal-making’ fosters corrupt practices” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 289). 
This statement not only alludes to consociationalism’s inherent susceptibility to corruption, it 
justifies the hypothesis of general interest in this research. This being said, this chapter shall 
illustrate the methods that were implemented in the research to test the hypothesis quantitatively 
and qualitatively. 
 It is highly important to list both the quantitative and the qualitative research questions of 
this study: 
1. What are the effects of corruption on consociational democracies? 
2. Are non-consociational democracies less corrupt? 
3. To what types of corruption are consociational democracies prone? 
4. Is there a relevant country that has a clear connection between consociationalism and 








 This is a secondary mixed-methods thesis. This means that both quantitative and 
qualitative data were collected from scholarly surveys and research, both of which were primary 
research. Moreover, peer-reviewed research and internationally recognized surveys constitute the 
foundation of data in this thesis.  
Sample 
 Given that the independent variables were consociational democracies, civil liberties and 
political rights, and the dependent variable was corruption, measuring these variables required 
internationally recognized measurement surveys. But consociational democracies were primarily 
identified from the studies mentioned in the chapter describing the review of the literature. In 
other words, in reviewing the literature, this thesis determined certain democracies to be 
consociational based on their presence in case studies conducted by scholars. Correspondingly, a 
nonrandom purposive sample was selected from a measurement list that rates countries’ degree 
of freedom based on their levels of political rights and civil liberties.   
For the purpose of comparison, thirteen non-consociational countries (that share some 
characteristics of consociational countries) were selected to be compared with thirteen 
consociational democracies. Each country had a numerical ranking of its level of corruption next 
to it; this measurement will be illustrated later. In addition, each country’s degree of political 
rights and civil liberties are measured on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being the highest and 7 being the 
lowest.        





The quantitative data measuring corruption collected from 2003 to 2012 was from 
“Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index”  
The index is an aggregate indicator that brings together data from a number of different 
sources. Each data source must fulfill the following criteria to qualify as a source for the 
Corruption Perceptions Index: 
 Quantifies perceptions of corruption in the public sector 
 Be based on a reliable and valid methodology, which scores and ranks 
multiple countries on the same scale 
 Performed by a credible institution and expected to be repeated regularly 
 Allow for sufficient variation of scores to distinguish between countries 
 (Short Methodology Note, 2012, p. 1). 
That source is invaluable because it uses a corruption ranking scale from 0 to 100, with 0 
being “fully corrupt” and 100 being “corruption-free.” The significance of the corruption index 
lies in its ranking measurements of corruption in countries, thus enabling comparisons.    
The second source was the Freedom House Organization website from 2003 to 2012. 
Among the data provided on the site, the survey of interest to this thesis is Freedom in the 
World:  
The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual evaluation of the progress and 
decline of freedom in 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories. The survey, 




according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights 
ratings are based on an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are 
based on an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights. (Methodology Summary, p.32)  
Thus, the previously mentioned survey’s data were used to determine the degree of 
freedom in the sample of countries used in this research. The logic behind determining the 
degree of freedom in countries is adding more supporting variables. It is worth noting that the 
Freedom in the World Survey uses two interval scales that define levels of political rights and 
civil liberties. The incorporation of the degree of countries’ freedom will enable comparisons of 
political rights and civil liberties to the level of corruption in a given country.   
 Given that consociational democracies are the most important in the comparison, non-
consociational countries were selected primarily because of their shared characteristics with 
consociational democracies. In doing so, consociational democracies could be fairly compared to 
countries that are similar to them. This thesis could have incorporated all countries, but this 








Quantitative Results  
 The literature review surveys existing work on the connections between 
consociationalism and corruption. While case studies do focus on the presence of corruption in 
specific countries, no systematic study of consociationalism and corruption has yet been 
undertaken. Following the literature review is a preliminary statistical exploration of the 
propensity of consociational political systems to succumb to corruption. Twenty-six countries 
were selected and divided into two groups. The first group, non-consociational countries, 
included the following countries: Costa Rica, Croatia, Germany, Denmark, Poland, South Africa, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, Iran, Australia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The second 
sample consisted of consociational countries: Belgium, Iraq, Nigeria, Malaysia, Macedonia, 
Austria, Indonesia, Colombia, Cyprus, India, Netherlands, Lebanon, and Bosnia.  
 Using measurements of freedom established by the non-governmental organization Freedom 
House and indices of corruption reported by Transparency International, a simple regression 
confirmed a statistically-significant association over a ten-year period between the two variables. 
Consociational countries were more corrupt than non-consociational ones. Moreover, increases 
in political rights in a given country are associated with a decrease in corruption. Surprisingly, 
increases in civil rights are associated with an increase in corruption.  
The regression produced an R
2 
(.46) that indicates a moderate relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable. The fact that a country has a consociational governing 
arrangement is associated a 14 point worsening in its corruption ranking compared to a non-
consociational country (since, on the Transparency International scale, the more corrupt a 




one-point improvement (i.e. a lower number) in the political rights component of the Freedom 
House index is associated with a 10 point improvement (i.e. a higher number) in the 
Transparency International corruption index for both consociational and non-consociational 
countries. Interestingly, a one point improvement in the civil liberties component of the Freedom 
House index is associated with an even larger (nearly 19 point) worsening in the corruption 
















Chapter Four: Case Study  
How does consociationalism in Lebanon lead to corrupt favoritism? 
As pressing as the issue of consociationalism and corruption is, it is necessary to embark 
upon a case study that is relevant to the research’s interest. This being said, this thesis used 
Lebanon to be the case study for many reasons. First, Lebanon has been ranked eighteenth on the 
Transparency International Corruption Index 2012, which means it has high levels of corruption. 
Second, Lebanon is clearly consociational based not only on Lijphart’s study of it as part of his 
consociational cross-national research but also on the National Covenant in 1943 and the Taif 
Accord in 1989, which will be discussed in detail later on. This case study will focus on the main 
crux of this thesis, which is how consociational entities are prone to corruption, specifically 
favoritism.  
For the purpose of clarification, the following terms that are related to consociationalism 
require some definitions. First, clientalism, which “is a set of interpersonal relations of a 
hierarchical nature based on unequal exchange between patrons and clients” (Makhoul and 
Harrison, 2004, p. 28), is one of the societal features that lead to corrupt favoritism in a 
consociational arrangement. Second, the term sectarianism, in the case of Lebanon, refers to the 
legitimate political engagement and parliamentary representation of religious groups. Tellingly, 
the consociational nature of Lebanese politics provides legitimate access for religious sects to 
actively participate in the political arena. Last, confessionalism in Lebanon reflects its 





The Republic of Lebanon       
The Republic of Lebanon, which declared its dependence in 1943, is an Arab 
parliamentary democratic country and a member of the Arab League with its political capital in 
Beirut. With over 10,452 square kilometers of land area, Lebanon is located on the east coastline 
of the Mediterranean Sea. Lebanon is headed by a president who is a representation of the 
national unity and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Ideally, the political system is 
grounded on the values “of separation, balance, and cooperation amongst the powers” (The 
Lebanese Political System).  
With respect to the branches of government, the legislative institution, called the 
Chamber of Deputies (Parliament), has 128 members who have four-year terms. In addition, 
given that Lebanon’s legislature is a parliamentary system, members or deputies of the 
legislative body elect a prime minister who serves as the head of the executive body. The prime 
minister composes his cabinet with the approval of the president of the republic. Judges, 
although independent in their exercise, are under the purview of the Ministry of Justice. 
Lebanese Society 
 Lebanese society is highly diverse and fragmented. Although diverse societies in 
countries that uphold civil society and have no consociational arrangements employ this diversity 
to their countries’ interest, Lebanon’s diverse society in their consociational arrangement has led 
to entrenched religious sectarianism (Makhoul and Harrison, 2004; Hudson, 1999). With the 
cleavage between Muslims and Christians that exacerbated sectarianism, seventeen sectarian 




 Because of the mere existence of these seventeen sectarian groups and manipulations of 
patron-client relations of the consociational system have made them politically active, Shields 
(2008) argues that two civil wars ignited in Lebanon—the first in 1958 and the second from 1975 
to 1990. Confessional groups in Lebanon emanate from Christianity or Islam (Shields, 2008). 
The breakdowns of these confessional groups are as follows:  
Christians—Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian 
Catholic, and Protestant (Salamey and Payne, 2008); and Muslims—Sunni, Shiite, Druze, 
Alawite, and Ismaelite (Salamey and Payne, 2008). 
The Consequences of the 1975–1990 Civil War 
 While Lebanon’s pre-1975 consociational system empowered some sects over others, 
some observers argue that consequence of that was the devastating 1975 civil war that lasted for 
fifteen years. While Lebanon was an embodiment of success for a consociational democracy, 
according to Arend Lijphart, after the civil war erupted, consociational theory was considered 
otherwise (Lijphart, 1987; Devre, 2011). In an attempt to stop the civil war, the Lebanese 
government requested Syrian assistance (Shields, 2008). As a result, in June 1976, the Syrian 
government deployed 30,000 troops to Lebanon in an effort to end the fighting (Shields, 2008).  
 Although the Syrian troops made significant efforts to stop the war, unfortunately, the 
bloodshed did not stop until the Taif Accord was reached in 1989, which was sponsored by 
Saudi Arabia (Shields, 2008). The main objectives of the Taif Accord were not only to end the 
civil war but also to organize a fairer power-sharing representation among the sectarian groups. 
“The Taif Accord modified the National Pact by increasing the number of parliamentary seats 




number of seats was changed again through 1992 electoral law to 128 seats (64 Christian, 64 
Muslim)” (Shields, 2008). In addition, the agreement stipulated that the president of the republic 
had to be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker of the house a Shiite. “The Taif 
Accord also extended the term of the Shia Speaker from one year to four years, reduced the 
power of the Maronite Christian president, and increased the power of the Sunni prime minister” 
(Shields, 2008).  
 In general, the Taif Accord temporarily mitigated the tensions among sectarian groups. 
Because the agreement expanded parliamentary seats to 128, each sectarian group was given a 
number of seats based on the group’s population (Salamey and Payne, 2008). Therefore, in each 
electoral district, seats are recognized as belonging to sectarian groups, with each individual 
chosen by votes (Salamey and Payne, 2008).  
 It did not take much time for the Taif Accord’s drawbacks to surface. Although the 
agreement did end the civil war, it did not make significant changes in the patronage-driven, 
sectarian-based system that was adopted in 1943 (Salamey and Payne, 2008). Indeed, instead of 
taking the initiative to put the civil war as an example of the shocking consequences of 
imbalances in the system, group leaders have agreed to merely update the current system. The 
Lebanese people could have taken the opportunity to call for a form of democracy that 
establishes civil societal institutions and identifies citizens and officials solely by their Lebanese 
citizenships, not by their sectarian affiliation. Lebanon’s sectarian elites rarely reach a consensus 
on policies, and the Taif Accord exacerbated this problem by adding more sectarian elites 






 When conducting a study on Lebanon’s political system, the legislative body is central to 
the research because Lebanon is a consociational parliamentary democracy, and as such, the 
executive extends from the legislature. Moreover, “it is the legislative body that summons the 
collective will of society and institutionally channels the political struggle for power” (Salamey 
and Payne, 2008, p. 452). Tellingly, lacking a close observation of the nature of Lebanon’s 
legislature, the features that infiltrated its consociational system will more likely be intractable 
and, thus, the anticipated susceptibility consociationalism with corruption will be almost 
impossible to detect.  
 Lebanon’s political apparatus is based on two main two initiatives, the 1926 Constitution 
and the unwritten National Pact of 1943 (Salamey and Payne, 2008). With respect to the Taif 
Accord, however, it amended the Constitution and modified the National Pact (Salamey and 
Payne, 2008). Although the Constitution established the branches of government, it also 
established a weak legislature that gave the executive branch far more leverage and dominance 
than the others (Salamey and Payne, 2008). As a result, the bulk of the legislature’s work has 
involved dealing with the confessional disputes among sectarian representatives regarding the 
Christian Maronite and Muslim Sunni executive policies.  
 Due to the consociational nature of Lebanese politics, the legislature has not become an 
institution that represents the people and a place for deliberation; it has become an arena of 
conflict with constant gridlock. This being said, it is worth describing how Lebanon manifests 





Positive Impacts of Consociationalism in Lebanon 
 In societies plagued with cross-cutting cleavages among different ethnic or religious 
groups, power-sharing solutions have been able to prevent outbreaks of civil wars (Jeog, 2005; 
Devre, 2011). As one of the power-sharing theories, consociationalism is considered a liberal 
democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986; Devre, 2011). According to Shils (1966), “Lebanon is a 
country which must be kept completely still politically in order to prevent communal self-
centeredness and mutual distrust from turning into active and angry contention” (as cited in 
Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 455). In Lebanon, the consociational system has moderated “inter-
denominational tensions,” which has enabled sectarian groups with different religions coexist 
(Salamey & Payne, 2008). Indeed, in some periods of Lebanon’s history, consociational 
arrangements mitigated sectarian tensions. As a matter of fact, consociationalism 
institutionalized sectarianism that was unorganized.  
Consociationalism in Lebanon 
 Consociationalism in Lebanon built upon the society’s long experience with ethnic or 
religious leaders that engage in Lebanese politics. Historically, Mount Lebanon’s political and 
socioeconomic organization has been relatively feudal (Hamzeh, 2001; Harik, 1966). Hence, the 
grand coalition of religious or ethnic leaders that consociationalism had to offer and the 
subordination of groups to those leaders were easily embraced due to the feudal nature of 
Lebanon’s political and economic environment. 
 In Arabic, the feudal system is called “Al Eqtaia,” and the feudal leader was referred to as 
“Muqataji.” However, this feudal leader was subservient to an emir, who had this superior 




Lebanon were the Shihabs, who ranked first, “followed by the Abi Al-Lama and the Arslans, all 
of whom were given the princely title of emir. Next in line came the families with the title of 
shaykh, including the Druze Junblats and Talhuqs and the Maronite Khazins. Almost equally 
important were the Shiite Hamadeh shaykhs, not to mention the Khuri and Karam shatkhs, both 
of whom were Maronites” (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 168). 
 The major feature of Lebanon’s late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century feudal 
system was that personal loyalty and obedience were rendered to the feudal emirs (Hamzeh, 
2001). With respect to consociationalism, the Lebanese political system has shifted from feudal 
to consociational without significant behavioral changes in the society. In fact, the obedience that 
Lebanese people used to render to the feudal lords was simply transferred to the consociational 
arrangement. But success was not the system’s eventual fate.  
 “Lebanon’s power-sharing democracy takes a consociational or group-building block 
approach and relies on accommodation by political leaders, decision-making by consensus, and 
active participation by minority groups” (Shields, 2008, p. 475). According to Salamey and 
Payne (2008), the Constitution and the Taif Accord were the main impetus for instituting 
consociationalism in Lebanon. This system has allocated the highest public offices to sectarian 
groups (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Hence, consociationalism institutionalizes feudal lords’ 
positions as forms of government positions. This shows how feudal lords were given the 
opportunity to continue their dominance in a legal, institutional manner. 
 By establishing this consociational system, confessional groups have been given access to 
governmental patronage (Hamzeh, 2001). This is evident in the families from which 




considered to have inherited their parliamentary seats from family members (Hamzeh, 2001). 
Although governmental patronage and favoritism are not endorsed by the consociational theory, 
it has led to them in Lebanon’s case in which pretexting patron-client relations have increased by 
means of Lebanon’s consociational system. Tellingly, the favoritism example directs this 
research toward an essential issue in Lebanon, which is corruption.  
Corruption in Lebanon 
    Distributional rights and communal identity are interrelated in Lebanon because of 
confessional groups’ patron-client relationships (Shields, 2008). In other words, in order to have 
access to government services in general, a Lebanese individual has to have good connections. 
Government services that are rendered by patrons, for example, are driver’s licenses, government 
projects, college admissions, etc. (Hamzeh, 2001). Correspondingly, the majority of government 
services will be rendered to people who have connections, and ultimately, corruption will occur. 
In these connections, the person who will provide the service will either need money in exchange 
or provide the service because the person who requested it is from the same sectarian group.   
“Although corruption has existed long before the civil war in Lebanon, the 
implementation of the new power sharing system seems to have bolstered state corruption to new 
levels” (Devre, 2011, p. 222). The consociational system has put in place sectarian elites who 
have contributed to a citizen-government relationship based on favoritism and cronyism. Due to 
the new, updated system of power-sharing, each sectarian elite is distributing benefits to 
whomever it pleases, and this has led to state corruption (Young, 1998; Devre, 2011). Corruption 
in the form of favoritism and cronyism has not only eroded the legislature, it has also affected the 




Sunni prime minister controls the finance ministry and, consequently, he controls Lebanon’s 
political economy and its decision-making process (Devre, 2011).    
As mentioned in this thesis, the pillars of consociationalism are “(1) a grand coalition of 
elites from different groups, (2) a veto for each group in important policy areas, (3) proportional 
representation in key institutions, and (4) group autonomy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25), and there is 
evidence of corruption in the majority of these pillars in Lebanon. With respect to 
proportionality, Lebanon’s sectarian elites have employed cronyism and favoritism for their 
groups in order to maintain their seats (Devre, 2011). Although consociationalism’s 
proportionality is not limited to parliamentary seats, sectarian elites in Lebanon used this 
advantage in a negative way to dominate certain bureaucracies. This has made Lebanon’s 
bureaucracies as separate entities that reflect each sectarian group. Instead of using 
proportionality within bureaucracies, Lebanon’s sectarian elites have applied it among 
bureaucracies (Devre, 2011). Moreover, given that each sectarian group used its veto rights for 
their own interests while undermining the nation’s interest, these veto rights have caused 
parliamentary stalemates that have prevented many bills from passing (Devre, 2011). Again, this 
does not mean that consociationalism is corrupt, but the patron-client relationship in Lebanon has 
infiltrated the pillars of consociationalism and, hence, exacerbating corruption.   
Regarding group autonomy in Lebanon, it has been utilized for group benefits, but it also 
has separated the nation, making groups, theoretically, in separate worlds. Finally, “grand 
coalitions made it possible that political blocs were formed along sectarian lines, which again 
bolstered favoritism and cronyism” (Devre, 2011, p. 236). By having this autonomy, the notion 




Lebanon’s consociationalism has applied proportionality in public sector appointments as 
consociationalism prescribes. But the patron-client relations have exacerbated favoritism (Devre, 
2011). Due to the abundance of benefits their positions offer, sectarian elites have managed to 
convince their group members that access to government services and rights cannot be done 
individually. Instead, sectarian group members have to ask their sectarian elites for services. Due 
to the patron-client  relations in Lebanon, elites have made the political climate more sectarian 
than it was. The power-sharing principle was applied to preclude conflict among confessional 
groups and to make government more efficient, but it seems that sectarian elites want to 
reinforce sectarianism and not compromise. While in many democracies candidates running for 
office promise prosperity to all citizens, the practice of consociationalism in Lebanon made 
sectarian candidates promise benefits only for their own groups. Indeed, people running for 
office in Lebanon make their group members feel that they are going to a battlefield to fight for 
them. Although it is normal in a consociational system that elites strive to benefit their groups, 
but the Lebanese elites have unfairly distrusted wealth to their groups (Devre, 2011). “Political 
elites were able to draw upon the fears of domination by other confessional groups to protect 
their own status as defenders of their groups versus leaders from other religious factions” 
(Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 464). Consociationalism was not put in place for elites to compete, 
it is intended to make elites cooperate.  
The quota system in parliament, as mentioned before, was put in place to accommodate 
the seventeen recognized sects. But, unfortunately, this system has influenced electoral behavior. 
Citizens cast their votes for candidates of their own religious sects, not on the basis of merit or 
the candidate’s political agenda (Devre, 2011). In turn, there is no real competition among 




lack of competition, campaigning will least likely include promises for reform; instead, 
campaign promises will be based on more sectarian representation in government.   
Sectarian influence has not been confined to men only; women have been influenced by it 
as well. Many Lebanese female critics claim that the six women in parliament do not represent 
Lebanese women. In addition, these representatives have been handpicked by sectarian elites 
and, thus, cannot engage in parliamentary activities that will harm those elites (Salamey & 
Payne, 2008). This means that female representatives cannot support policies pertaining to all 
Lebanese women, should these policies conflict with elite interests.   
Consociationalism in Lebanon has created a political environment of brokers. Each 
individual seeks to make deals with representatives, bureaucrats, judges, and so on in order to 
finish any government work. In this corrupt environment, sectarian elites will prevent any 
initiative to change the system because they enjoy the lion’s share of benefits that the system has 
to offer. The major problem is that consociationalism perpetuates sectarian elites’ existence by 
giving them permanent positions in the grand coalition. Any attempt to amend the system will be 
fought on the basis of fear of another civil war. In other words, if any concerned Lebanese 
demands change that will affect elites’ political positions, the elites will convince the Lebanese 
people that this change will make them go into conflict among each other and will eventually 
lead to another civil war. 
With Lebanon’s being a weak state, which has led to Syrian troop presence to maintain 
security, Syrian pressure on Lebanon’s electoral system has resulted in corruption in the form of 
gerrymandering of some districts for presidential elections (U. N., 2006; Shields, 2008). 




Syria. In this light, sectarian elites who are benefiting from any foreign country will not stop at 
preventing any attempt to reform the electoral system. Lebanon’s weak state has contributed to 
forcing factions to look for support beyond Lebanon’s borders (Hudson, 1968; Salamey & 
Payne, 2008).  
Foreign intervention is not confined to the electoral system, however. Given the 
geostrategic position of Lebanon, confessional elites have established foreign alliances (Salamey 
and Payne, 2008). This is a result of the vulnerability of the Lebanese state in efforts to maintain 
its sovereignty. Sectarian elites utilize their foreign support to fortify their domestic positions 
(Salamey & Payne, 2008). “Shiite Hezbollah and the Amal Movement aligned themselves with 
Syria and Iran; Sunni, Druze, and some Maronite groups sought the support of both France and 
the U.S.” (Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 458). Patron-client relations have contributed to these 
foreign alliances for which the system divides citizens along sectarian lines. Undoubtedly, the 
Lebanese society will not unite and will continue to consider its government weak in light of the 
role of sectarian elites.     
It seems that in the absence of robust institutions, the phenomena of favoritism and 
cronyism practiced by sectarian elites will not end (Devre, 2011). It looks as though Lebanese 
elites want the status quo to persist. As they did during the civil war and continue to, Spears 
argues that elite favoritism will continue (Spears, 2000; Devre, 2011). Tellingly, the prevalence 
of favoritism and cronyism in Lebanon is being extended to and supported by elites who 
consider themselves to be saving the country from a new civil war.  
Passing laws to end state corruption seems impossible given the veto rights that each 




many previous attempts to counter corruption (Devre, 2011). While Lebanon is considered one 
of the few democratic countries in the Arab world, the authority and immunities that sectarian 
elites enjoy undermine Lebanon’s democracy. Indeed, while autocratic regimes are criticized for 
the one-man rule and dominance of their countries, in Lebanon’s case, each a sectarian elite, with 
all the authority at its disposal, is relatively functioning as an autocrat—but in a more complex 
manner because of the many sectarian elites who have the authority of an autocrat in one 
country.  
Instead of positively using quotas to the country’s benefit, “confessional groups have 
focused on grasping onto the patronage spoils from the division of public sector offices and 
resources, trading alliances and allegiances in efforts to maintain or increase their proportion of 
influence” (Salamey & Payne, 2008, p. 456). In this patronage environment, networks, rather 
than bureaucratic institutions, are handling distributional issues (Leenders, 2003; Devre, 2011). 
In order to reinforce their patronage networks, sectarian elites compete with one another for 
access to public goods, which makes it a zero-sum game (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Sectarian 
elites have segmented the political order into patriarchal units that they dominate, and, hence, 
they negotiate among themselves for control of and access to public resources and goods 
(Salamey & Payne, 2008). Lacking any sort of legitimate competition, however, confessional 
elites will continue to build larger networks of patronage (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Evidently, 
when any given official knows that he will not face competition and the position in which he 
resides is permanent, corrupt practices of patronage, favoritism, and cronyism will prevail. This 
goes back to the historical patron-client relationships in the Lebanese society that has distorted 




As much as patron-client relationships have contributed to corruption in Lebanon’s 
consociational system, it has also affected the society. Postwar Lebanese society is still held 
captive by the prewar patron-client interactions (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). Warlords are 
providing jobs and connections for business owners and merchants (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004), 
a practice that has made the Lebanese people clients for warlords, who are now the confessional 
elites. Lebanese society is basically doing the same deal making that happens in parliament, 
though in a different setting. “This situation has made the cliental system more 
socioeconomically entrenched and effective, facilitated by tight labor market conditions, which 
has tied the clients more tightly in their livelihood to the destiny and whims of their patrons” 
(Ofeish, 1999, p. 112).  
In many postcolonial countries, the political arrangement is clientalist, in which citizen 
rights are weak with regard to regulations and procedures, and, thus, informal groups play a 
major role in regulations (Khan, 1996, 1998; Neal & Tansey, 2010). According to Walzer, in 
circumstances in which clientalism prevails, corruption shall manifest in some form of political 
life and business (Walzer, 1973; Neal & Tansey, 2010). In this clientalist environment, 
government institutions will inevitably become weak and may succumb to corruption.  
While confessional elites are in governmental positions, patrons can be members of labor 
unions or militias (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). Basically, these organizations are hierarchically 
structured, with sectarian elites at the top and patrons working at the bottom, close to the public. 
For example, when a Lebanese citizen needs service, he simply requests it from the patron in his 
district. In this way, patrons and clients benefit mutually because the client gets his service and 




2004). With such support, the patron can be assured that when he runs for a municipal position, 
for example, he will be able to get his clients’ votes. 
In Arabic, patrons in Lebanon are called zu’ama (plural) and zaim (singular). The 
practice that is built on patron-client interactions is called wasta in Arabic. Wasta is “the ability 
to attract a client group and attain access to a power broker” (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 170). Criticism 
of the role of wasta is common in almost every Arab country to the extent that even illiterate 
Arabs usually know what it means. The term is so common that it used colloquially. A person 
who has wasta can obtain a variety of favors, like a job or even a college admission (Makhoul & 
Harrison, 2004). 
Obviously, in order to have access to wasta, an individual must establish good relations 
with patrons. Patrons are from wealthy families, and their societal positions are hereditary 
(Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). While democracies that have real civil society institutions and 
clear, open channels for citizen participation have no patrons, in Lebanon it is relatively hard for 
an individual to obtain services from the government without the help of a patron. This 
arrangement is common in many Arab countries; in Lebanon, the patrons are divided along 
sectarian lines. “The inability among some of Lebanon’s political elite to embrace normative, 
democratic standards of behavior to guide negotiations, encourage compromise and promote 
cooperation, particularly since the Syrian withdrawal, has made it impossible to institutionalize 
these values in a way which would promote democratic reform” (Shields, 2008, p. 485).   
As mentioned earlier, unlike sectarian elites, patrons interact closely with the Lebanese 
people and consider them clients. This close relationship gives patrons a better understanding of 




Lebanon and in other countries, for some people, it is their only alternation. Since the 
confessional elites in higher positions in government are in favor of corruption, any grassroots 
effort to end the corruption will be blocked. The more this patron-client behavior continues, the 
more likely the Lebanese society will continue to depend on getting services through favors 
(Gubser, 1974; Knight, 1992; Salem, 1973; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). In fact, if this patron-
client arrangement permeates Lebanese society, it will likely be extremely hard to change 
(Roniger, 1994; Hamzeh, 2001; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004).     
Given that sectarian elites have foreign support, which solely benefits members of their 
groups, the Lebanese state cannot offer public goods and services like elites do (Makhoul & 
Harrison, 2004). This means that an individual who does not ask patrons for services and instead 
goes directly to the state will not receive the services that he or she needs. In turn, this individual 
will not have any option other than seeking wasta from a zaim for the needed service. 
The patron-client influence goes beyond simple services. In fact, even the judicial system 
is susceptible to it. For example, if a zaim facilitates the process of appointing a judge, that judge 
would probably be lenient toward a criminal who is affiliated with that zaim (Makhoul & 
Harrison, 2004). This shows the extent of the patrons’ enormous leverage. Had it not been for 
consociationalism in Lebanon, which instituted the patron-client relationships, citizens could 
have pursued other means to get services from the government. Indeed, the extent of patron-
client relations in Lebanon has divided the society and made it almost impossible for citizens to 
consider themselves equal in their own country. Hence, the structure of the Lebanese political 




impossible to achieve in a political system plagued with client-patron relationships (Anderson, 
2000; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004).   
The ideal of a greater Lebanon that treats all citizens equally is relatively hard to achieve. 
This is quite obvious given that elites in the political system and patrons in the society are 
benefiting from the status quo. Confessional traditions have benefited political leaders to the 
extent that they impede any bureaucratic development due to concerns of losing their interests 
(Salibi, 1988; Salem, 1973; Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). In the leaders’ attempt to perpetuate 
patron-client relationships, “it is useful to blame the government for neglect and to cast 
themselves as the protectors of the people” (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004, p. 30). Hence, 
development is prevented by these patron-client relationships (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). 
Another example of the power of patron-client relations is government projects in 
villages. In a case study conducted by Jihad Makhoul and Lindsey Harrison, the influence of 
wasta in two Lebanese villages, Dar el Lawz and Ain Zeitoun, was observed (Makhoul & 
Harrison, 2004).  In Dar el Lawz, for example, villagers would not have had a mosque built in 
their village had it not been for their access to wasta (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). Although 
these villagers benefited from their wasta, a schoolteacher in Ain Zeitoun was not satisfied with 
the role of wasta (Makhoul & Harrison, 2004). According to an interview conducted by Makhoul 
and Harrison (2004), a male teacher said about the school principal “he is corrupt and has been 
accused of stealing the school money and spending it. They could not fire him. The problem is 
not with the man, but the currents that steer him” (p. 32). This frustrated schoolteacher displays 
the extent to which wasta plays a negative role in his village and also shows how it gives 




Arab countries in which certain government employees can either arrive to work late or use their 
positions for personal gain with no accountability, even if complaints are raised against them.  
Lebanon’s consociational system stipulates that the highest positions in government are 
determined along sectarian lines; the president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a 
Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the house a Shiite Muslim. In this consociational power-
sharing arrangement, competition among sectarian candidates is minimal because the positions 
are fixed. Unless there is another strong candidate from the same sect who decides to run against 
an incumbent, the incumbent’s position is almost permanent. Hence, enjoying minimal 
competition and healthy support from his sectarian group, the incumbent could easily engage in 
corrupt practices. For example, Rafik Hariri had minimal competition and thus his engagement 
in corruption to reconstruct Lebanon was not faced with harsh criticism from his Sunni group 
(Neal & Tansey, 2010).  
Lebanon is supposedly democratic (Issawi, 1966; Neal & Tansey, 2010). “The surface 
appearance of democracy, however, conceals a subculture of political corruption, embedded in a 
traditional political clientalist system, headed at the top by national (zaims) leaders” (Neal & 
Tansey, 2010, p. 39). In this context, it is imperative to mention Lebanon’s former prime 
minister Rafik Hariri. A well-known billionaire, Hariri served as Lebanon’s prime minister from 
1992 to1998 and from 2000 to 2004 (Abu Rizk, 2004; Neal & Tansey, 2010). Formerly, Hariri 
was a diplomatic representative in Saudi Arabia, where he played a major role in the negotiations 
that brought about the Taif Accord (Miller, 2005; Sbaiti, 1994; Neal & Tansey, 2010).  
Although Hariri helped manifest the Taif Accord and reconstruct Lebanon after the civil 




public debt was $5 billion and had increased to $35 billion by October 2004 (Becherer, 2005; 
Neal & Tansey, 2010). Hariri’s corruption is considered by some Lebanese to be effective 
corruption (Neal & Tansey, 2010). But others criticize him for benefiting his own sectarian 
group and bringing businesses to their district. Hariri’s corruption is only one example of many 
that patron-client relations have contributed to corrupting the political system. 
 Eventually, the end result of Lebanon’s confessional system is a self-perpetuating capture 
of the state by confessional elites who are immune to accountability and undermine the role of 
government as the main regulator (Salamey & Payne, 2008). Thus, corruption will be curbed 
only if it harms those elites. This is counterproductive to the development of a modern 
democracy.         
Conclusion 
 In societies plagued with cross-cutting cleavages, a conflict management system is 
necessary in order for ethnic or religious groups to coexist and not to resort to war to resolve 
their issues. Indeed, as a liberal peace theory, consociationalism was conceptualized by Arend 
Lijphart to help stabilize countries that struggle with fragmented societies. And 
consociationalism did play a major role in stabilizing Lebanon’s society, but the 1975 civil war 
proved to be its undoing. The problem that consociationalism brought about in Lebanon is that it 
has put warlords in the highest positions of government. 
 Instead of being a temporary arrangement, consociationalism not only became the norm 
in Lebanon but also came to be seen as the only successful system for the country. Undoubtedly, 
sectarian elites have taken advantage of the many benefits that consociationalism has rendered to 




consociationalism gave sectarian elites legitimate authority for them to use at their disposal. And 
this authority was given to them on the basis of preventing any potential civil war. Hence, out of 
fear, consociationalism has rendered supreme authority to sectarian elites, and, in turn, any 
engagement in corruption by those elites cannot be countered due to fear of another civil war. 
As this case study argues, Lebanon’s patron-clients relationships have infiltrated the 
consociational system and, thus, contributed to the proliferation of corrupt favoritism. Since the 
system has put confessional elites in the grand coalition along sectarian lines, each sectarian elite 
will likely favor members of its own group. This is quite evident in the quota-based legislature, 
where affiliation, not merit, is the primary requirement for gaining a parliamentary seat.  
The basic requirements for becoming president, prime minister, or speaker of the house 
perpetuate sectarianism, and, hence, the system is prone to corruption. A bold example of this, as 
mentioned earlier, is the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, who engaged in corruption in both 
of the terms he served. Due to the consociational stipulations that require that a prime minister 
position to be given to a Sunni Muslim, Hariri’s corruption was not supported by many citizens 
in Lebanon, except Sunnis. Obviously, any sectarian sect will not oppose actions that benefit 
them.  
While consociationalism has been abused in Lebanon by producing corrupt favoritism in 
government, its influence has trickled down to the society. Patron-client relationships are a good 
example of how consociationalism has made favoritism an important facilitator in the citizenry’s 
getting its demands met. Like sectarian elites, patrons, or zu’ama, attract members from their 
sects in exchange for favors. This means that it is least likely for a Muslim Sunni to seek favors 




dividing the society in government, the more likely it is that patrons, at the societal level, will 
continue engaging in this type of behavior.  
While the notion of wasta is prevalent in many Arab countries, Lebanon’s consociational 
system institutionalized it. In other words, wasta, as a form of corruption, is considered 
legitimate when used among sectarian members based on the authority that consociationalism 
gives them. For example, if two Lebanese citizens—a Sunni and a Maronite—apply for a job, 
and the only vacant position is reserved for Sunnis, the Sunni citizen will get the job. The 
problem here is that the Sunni will get the job even if the Maronite citizen is more qualified. In 
addition, if two Sunnis apply for that job, the one who has wasta will be hired, and, of course, 
due to the consociational system, any complaint about that will not get far. 
While consociationalism endeavors to resolve conflict in fragmented societies, in 
Lebanon’s case, it has deepened the existing divisions in these societies. As a result, as in the 
case of Lebanon, corrupt favoritism prevails, and any attempt to stop it will be blocked by the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the consociational system, the confessional elites.  
All in all, consociationalism had maintained stability in Lebanon prior to the 1975 civil 
war, but the pre-existing patron-client relations made consociationalism a mean to 
institutionalize corrupt favoritism. This favoritism is embodied in sectarian elites who have 
practiced it in government, and, eventually, society followed suit. Lebanon is considered one of 
the few Arab democratic countries, but in order to be considered a full democracy, it has to 
adhere to a civil system that treats citizens equally, not according to sectarian lines. In doing so, 




democratic system is applied in Lebanon, sectarian elites will no longer advocate remaining in 


























Chapter Five: Discussion  
Given that this chapter focuses on interpreting the results of this mixed-methods research, 
it is worth reiterating that this research was designed to test the validity of the correlation 
between consociationalism and corruption. While consociationalism has maintained temporary 
stability in some fragmented societies, depending on it has rendered negative consequences. 
Based on this premise, the following paragraphs shall illustrate the results of the study along with 
a detailed interpretation of all quantitative and qualitative measurements. 
 Prior to embarking upon interpreting the results of the thesis, it is crucial to explain why 
this thesis has utilized mixed methods. Quantitative results that established a correlation between 
consociational countries and corruption have prompted the case study to investigate corruption in 
Lebanon. In addition, given the importance of assessing the performance of systems that were 
put in place for the purpose of conflict resolution, a mere utilization of quantitative data, with a 
presumably large number of cases, will require case study examples. Thus, the qualitative case 
study on Lebanon has served as an example of how consociational systems are prone to 
corruption.  
As mentioned in the methods chapter, two quantitative measurements were used in this 
study. The first measure was from the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey. This was 
used to measures the degree of freedom in countries from 2003 to 2012 and was utilized to 
determine the degree of civil liberties and political rights in the two samples. The non-
consociational sample was purposely selected because this would be a fair sample of non-




 Moreover, in the sample of consociational countries, only four out of the thirteen 
countries were labeled as completely free countries. This suggests an important point pertaining 
to the role of elites in the grand coalition. Since elites in consociational countries are the supreme 
representatives who deliberate and render policies, it seems that in free consociational countries, 
elites have restraints on their authority. As in the case of Lebanon, which was labeled as partly 
free, confessional elites do not have strong oversight and, thus, restraint on their power is most 
likely minimal. This is due to the corrupt favoritism that sectarian elites benefit from. Given that 
the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey measures the degree of freedom according to 
political rights and civil liberties, the four consociational countries categorized as completely 
free must have good restraints on elites’ authority. And, elites in the other nine consociational 
countries that have been categorized as partly free or not free must have authority that is not 
subject to oversight.   
The second measurement was from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index from 2003 to 2012. Since corruption rates among countries varied in both samples, data 
were statistically tested. A simple regression confirmed a statistically-significant association over 
a ten-year period between the two variables. Consociational countries were more corrupt than 
non-consociational ones. Moreover, increases in political rights in a given country are associated 
with a decrease in corruption. Surprisingly, increases in civil rights are associated with an 
increase in corruption. Hence, this result enabled the thesis to reject the null hypothesis. 
By rejecting the null hypothesis, this statistical test has suggested that consociational 
democracies are prone to corruption. Indeed, the quota-based parliamentary seats, grand 




been infiltrated by patron-client relationships that have facilitated corrupt favoritism. Offering 
these arrangements to deeply divided societies would be welcomed by the elites, not the people. 
Ultimately, the elites will most likely favor their own groups and neglect national unity based on 
equal treatment of citizens. Again, the mere statistically based rejection of the null hypothesis 
puts more emphasis on the issue of how consociational democracies are prone to corruption.  
Although the qualitative case study of Lebanon focused on corruption, many 
counterproductive features have surfaced. Client-patron relations, wasta, and the role of the 
zu’ama are examples of how these features specific to Lebanon have contributed to corruption. 
As mentioned in the case study chapter, wasta means “the ability to attract a client group and 
attain access to a power broker” (Hamzeh, 2001, p. 170). And, zu’ama means “patrons.”  
The individuals responsible for the proliferation of wasta are to a great extent the 
sectarian elites and to a lesser extent the Lebanese society. Although the Lebanese society 
engages in wasta, this behavior would not have continued had it not been for the sectarian elites’ 
prior engagement in it. In other words, if sectarian elites had not engaged in wasta, the Lebanese 
society would have followed suit. Of course, in the case of wasta, sectarian elites are the ones 
considered as the sources of power. Hence, the consociational system in Lebanon 
institutionalized the role of wasta, making it a common and legal pathway for favors. In turn, 
corrupt favoritism legitimately prevails, and, consequently, an anticipated civil and fully 
democratic Lebanon shall be difficult to achieve.  
Again, as the case study reveals, the application of patron-client relationships in Lebanon 
have rendered various defects that have created many forms of corruption, especially ones 




culture drowned in corrupt favoritism. In order for citizens to survive in this environment, they 
have to engage in favoritism. The consociational system has been manipulated by these 
relationships which institutionalized favoritism and made the Lebanese society dependent on it.  
While consociationalism has promoted corrupt favoritism in government, its influence 
has trickled down to the society. Patron-client relations are a good example of how 
consociationalism has made favoritism an important facilitator in the citizenry’s efforts to get 
their demands met. Like sectarian elites, patrons, or zu’ama, attract members from their sects 
seeking favors. This means that it is least likely for a Muslim Sunni to seek favors from a 
Christian Maronite and vice versa. The more entrenchment of sectarian elites in dividing the 
society, the more likely patrons, at the societal level, will continue engaging in this type of 
behavior.  
While consociationalism endeavors to resolve conflict in fragmented societies, in reality, 
it has deepened the division in societies that are already divided. As a result, like in the case of 
Lebanon, corrupt favoritism prevails, and any attempt to stop it will be blocked by the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the consociational system, the confessional elites.  
Limitations 
 Since this thesis’s literature and data were secondary, meaning that this thesis derived 
them from other primary sources, there are many limitations to this thesis. Although the 
corruption index accurately measures corruption in countries, the problem with it is that it 
measures perceptions of corruption and not actual practices. This does not mean that 
Transparency International’s Corruption Index would not reflect corrupt favoritism, but a survey 




 Moreover, some consociational countries with somewhat high GDPs per capita are 
ranked quite highly on the corruption index. This variable was not controlled for in this thesis. 
Although this thesis rejects the null hypothesis, investigating the relationship between per capita 
GDP and corruption for consociational democracies would shed light on a new aspect of this 
thesis.  
 Lebanon represents only one case study and, hence, adding more case studies would 
allow for greater exploration of corruption in consociational countries with different cultures and 
characteristics. Since consociationalism has been adopted by various countries, not only Arab 
countries, case studies on European or Asian countries would make this research more 
comprehensive.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 As found in the literature review, many negative consequences of the application of the 
consociational system have been identified by scholars. Future research on those negative 
consequences is highly recommended. For example, in consociationalism literature, the 
prevalence of religious sectarianism, which made some governments confessional, has been 
clearly argued to negatively affect the consociational system. Research focusing on the role 
religious sectarianism in consociational countries will inevitably be beneficial to the body of 
consociationalism literature.  
 Moreover, developed societies function in democratic systems that uphold equality 
among all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. Based on this premise, 




systematically impedes the pathway to equality among citizens. Thus, research focusing on the 
reasons that consociationalism does this and possible solutions will be highly beneficial.  
 Consociationalism is a liberal democratic theory propounded for the purposes of conflict 
resolution, as in Lebanon’s situation, and it proved to maintain temporary stability before the 
civil war of 1975 broke out. Correspondingly, it is recommended that future research should 
provide evidence suggesting that consociationalism could be used as only a temporary system in 
fragmented societies until a better democratic system could be adopted.  
 A primary survey that specifically measures corrupt favoritism in consociational systems 
is recommended as a measurement tool in future research. By using such a tool, the research will 
be solely focusing on corrupt favoritism, and if the results are quantitatively significant, the 
hypothesis could be generalizable. If this significant measurement were utilized, it would add 
more evidence in the literature for opponents of consociationalism.  
 Consociational political arrangements are not per se corrupt. However, their vulnerability 
to rent-seeking behavior by organized groups makes them prone to corruption in a way that 
political systems with a more civic, rather than sectarian, basis are not. Further research focusing 
on the range of variables encouraging corruption in consociational systems will specify the 
relationship between consociationalism and corruption in a more comprehensive manner. As was 
evident in the case of Lebanon, social practices that solidify clientelistic relationships have the 
potential for infiltrating consociational governance, turning a political arrangement meant to 
manage conflict into one that maximizes the competitive extraction of resources by sectarian 
groups. Yet another research topic worth exploring in more detail is the relationship, captured in 




democratic governance more generally. This interesting finding invites an in-depth exploration 
of how increased civil liberties result in an increase in corruption.    
 All in all, the more research identifying specific features that distort consociationalism is 
published, the more likely nations sharing these same features and transitioning from 
authoritarian systems to democracies will alternate these features before adopting a 
consociational system. Merely providing a range of solutions to the negative social features 
infiltrate consociationalism helps prevent transitioning nations from falling into more societal 
strife.  
Conclusion   
 Many political scholars have published important research that has benefited many 
nations. These studies vary in their scopes and approaches, but ultimately they strive to construct 
new theories or shed light on deficiencies of existing theories. Eventually, the audience reading 
this research will benefit in some way. Since political science is a discipline in the social 
sciences, however, no theory or research is considered holistically correct. Hence, it is 
imperative that scholars review their colleagues’ research. Clearly, among the opponent scholars 
who have reviewed consociationalism, this thesis contributes to the opponents’ arguments.  
 Assessing the validity of political systems is relatively important given that political 
systems play a major role in people’s lives. This being said, because of the many negative 
consequences some social characteristics in some consociational have produced, it is of high 
importance that this thesis’s arguments be heard. Neglecting them will exacerbate social tensions 




 Given that this thesis has established a correlation between consociationalism and 
corruption, the consociational system should be evaluated. Indeed, Lebanon’s case study showed 
much evidence of corrupt favoritism in the system. Again, when a political system 
institutionalizes corrupt favoritism, making it a legal pathway for government services, it is no 
wonder why sectarian tensions are exacerbated.  
   Although consociationalism in Lebanon had maintained stability in the country prior to 
the 1975 civil war, that war not only proved the deficiencies of Lebanon’s consociationalism, it 
also systemically institutionalized corrupt favoritism. This favoritism is embodied in sectarian 
elites who have practiced it in government, and, eventually, the society followed suit. Lebanon is 
considered one of the few Arab democratic countries, but in order to be considered a full 
democracy, it has to reassess its patron-client relationships that are undermining its 
consociational democracy. By doing so, no corrupt official will appeal to a sectarian elite to help 
him in an illegal favor. In addition, if Lebanon mitigated corrupt favoritism, sectarian elites will 
no longer take advantage of remaining in the status quo under the threat of a potential civil war. 
   All in all, consociationalism is still a system that has been adopted by many nations for 
the purpose of conflict resolution, and the system has proven that it does maintain stability in 
fragmented societies, though it has done that temporarily in Lebanon. However, this thesis 
suggests that consociational democracies are prone to corruption and, hence, nations continuing 
to embrace this system should think of reforming the system if they want to mitigate their 
corruption rates. The prevalence of corruption, especially favoritism, should be taken seriously 









R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 














 .460 .454 18.219 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 72455.729 3 24151.910 72.759 .000
a
 
Residual 84977.082 256 331.942   
Total 157432.812 259    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Civil_Libs, Consociational, Pol_Rights 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 83.330 2.389  34.875 .000 
Consociational -14.324 2.282 -.291 -6.278 .000 
Pol_Rights 10.276 1.890 .791 5.437 .000 
Civil_Libs -18.618 2.138 -1.271 -8.707 .000 









































Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Consociational .981 1.019 
Pol_Rights .100 10.045 
Civil_Libs .099 10.098 
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